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PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL:
PRINCIPLE FROM PRECEDENTS: II*
Benjamin F. Boyert

FRAMEWORK FOR A PRINCIPLE, continued

D. Gratuitous Agency
It is ancient learning that a person is free to refuse to accept an appointment as agent but that "acceptance must be followed by execution
or prompt resignation."136 Though such was the law of the Romans
of Justinian's time, it has taken our courts many years to reach the
same conclusion. Indeed, it was not until the Restatement of Agency
was published in 1933 that the basis of liability of one who gratuitously
undertook to act as agent for another was expressed in approximately
the same form.
The Reporters on Agency for the American Law Institute, Professors Mechem and Seavey, stated their rule (in section 378) thus:
"One who, by a gratuitous promise or other conduct which he should
realize will cause another reasonably to rely upon the performance of
definite acts of service to him as the other's agent, causes the other to
refrain from having such acts done by other available means is subject
to a duty to use care to perform such service or, while other means are
available, to give notice that he will not perform."137
To lawyers nurtured on the oft-quoted statement that "the promisor
is not liable for nonfeasance but is liable for misfeasance,"138 such a
pronouncement may come as a surprise. How does it happen that the
American Law Institute was willing to sponsor a principle which ignores the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance and makes
liability depend on justifiable reliance rather than on payment for the
promise or the commencement of performance of the promised act?
When the Restatement of Agency was being considered, Professor
Seavey published an explanatory note on "Liability of Gratuitous
* Part I appeared in 50 MrcH. L. Rsv. 639 (1952).-Ed.
t Dean, Temple University School of Law.-Ed.
136 Inst. III.26.11: It is open to everyone to decline a commission of agency, but
acceptance must be followed by execution or by a prompt resignation, in order to enable
the principal to carry out his purpose either personally or by appointment of another agent.
Accord: THE CIVIL LA.w, S. P. Scott translation, Vol. 2, p. 129 (1932).
137 AGENCY REsTATI!MENT §378 (1933), Gratuitous Undertakings.
188 CLARX, CoNTRACTS §§64-65 (4th ed. by Throckmorton and Brightman, 1931);
ANsoN, CoNTRACTs, Patterson ed., §141 (1939).
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Agent"139 which shows the justification for holding a gratuitous agent to
his undertaking. He concludes that there are at least five categories of
cases which sustain section 378 of the Restatement of Agency:
(I) A gratuitous agent who has received possession of something
is liable if he negligently or disobediently deals with it;140
(2) A gratuitous agent, although not given possession of anything
by the principal, is subject to duties of obedience, care, and loyalty
in respect of transactions which he undertakes for the principal;141
(3) An agent who has received possession of something is liable
if he fails to deal with it in accordance with his undertaking;142
( 4) An agent gratuitously promising to act is subject to liability
to the promisee if he has begun to act in accordance with his undertaking and fails to continue to act as he has agreed;143
139 AM:smCAN LAw lNsnTtJTB, RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, Tentative Draft No. 7,
247-252 (1932). Secti.on 599 of this tentative draft became section 378 in the final arrangement of the restatement.
140 Jenkins v. Bacon, 111 Mass. 373 (1873); Kowing v. Manly, 49 N.Y. 192 (1872);
Maddock v. Riggs, 106 Kan. 808, 190 P. 12 (1920) (gratuitous agent liable for failing
to remit premiums on fraternal insurance policy); Criswell v. Riley, 5 Ind. App. 496, 30
N.E. 1101 (1892) (gratuitous procurement of insurance policy followed by -negligent
failure to pay premiums); First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Evans, 11 N.J. Misc. 19,
163 A. 667 (1932); Shiells and Thome v. Blackbume, 1 H.Bl. 158, 126 Eng. Rep. 94
(1789) (liability if defendant so negligently handled goods that they were lost); semble,
Commonwealth Co. v. Weber, 91 L.T.R. (N.S.) 813 (1904) (but no recovery if the
gratuitous handler of goods was not negligent); Hyde v. Moffat, 16 Vt. 271 (1844) (liability where gratuitous agent failed to record deed and refused to return it); Melbourne &
Gray v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 88 Ala. 443 at 449, 6 S. 762 (1889); Sunflower Compress Co. v. Clark, 165 Miss. 219 at 231, 145 S. 617 (1933) (tax collector liable for not
cashing check given him by taxpayer); Brewer v. Universal Credit Co., 191 Miss. 183,
192 S. 902 (1940) (finance company liable for not retaining, as promised, automobile of
owner who was delinquent in payments).
141 Johnson v. Jameson, (Mo. 1919) 209 S.W. 919 (evidence insufficient to prove
mortgagee agreed to buy at foreclosure sale and permit mortgagor to redeem); Phillips v.
Jackson, 240 Mo. 310, 144 S.W. 112 (1911) (mortgagee's gratuitous oral agreement to
buy at foreclosure and permit redemption, if made before sale, will be enforced); Tchula
Commercial Co. v. Jackson, 147 Miss. 296, 111 S. 874 (1927) (mortgagor recovered
$14,600 for mortgagee's breach of gratuitous promise to permit redemption); Waters v.
Hall, 218 -App. Div. 149, 218 N.Y.S. 31 (1926); Isham v. Post, 141 N.Y. 100, 35 N.E.
1084 (1894) (gratuitous loan agent liable for failure to use diligence promised); Hammond
v. Hussey, 51 N.H. 40 (1871) (gratuitous examiner liable to examinee for false report);
Kaw Brick Co. v. Hogsett & Woodward, 73 Mo. App. 432 at 438 (1898) (agent who
undertook to keep property insured for $7,000 liable for negligently failing to do so). But,
there must have been reliance. Frankfort Waterworks Co. v. McBride, 92 Ind. App. 680,
175 N.E. 140 (1931) (customer asked water company to tum off water in freezing
weather but tried to do it himself).
142 For the purposes of this article, the first and third of Professor Seavey's categories
may be considered as one. In both instances the promiser receives something from the
promisee. In neither case does he deal with it as he has promised, but acts negligently or
disobediently. Therefore, cases sustaining this proposition have been listed in note 140
supra.
.
143Wilkinson v. Coverdale, 1 Esp. 75, 170 Eng. Rep. 284 (1793) (one who gratuitously undertakes to obtain insurance but acts so negligently that insured is unable to
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(5) A gratuitous promisor who undertakes to serve as agent for
another may be held liable for failure to enter upon perforrnance.144
Examination of these categories and of the cases supporting them
will reveal again the tendency of our courts to deal in "compartmentalized" justice; they emphasize "agency," not action-in-reliance and
the avoidance of injustice. It will also demonstrate the validity of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel-a doctrine which the Agency Restaters, by the adoption of section 378, have emphasized effectively in
a narrow field.
recover for loss is liable to the promisee. Note, plaintiff was subsequently nonsuited for
failing to prove the promise); Elam v. Smithdeal Realty & Ins. Co., 182 N.C. 599, 109
S.E. 632 (1921) (gratuitous attempt to insure may make promisor liable if proper insurance is not obtained); Accord: Barile v. Wright, 256 N.Y. 1, ·175 N.E. 351 (1931); Warrener v. Federal Land Bank, 266 Ky. 668, 99 S.W. (2d) 817 (1936) [citing AGENCY
RESTATEMENT §378 (1933)]; Soule v. Union Bank, 45 Barb. 111, 30 How. Pr. 105 (N.Y.,
1865); Evan L. Reed Mfg. Co. v. Wurts, 187 lli. App. 378 (1914); Baxter v. Jones, 6
Ont. L. Rep. 360 (1903) (defendant obtained the promised additional insurance but failed
to notify other insurers as he had promised); Condon v. Exton-Hall Brokerage & Vessel
Agency, 80 Misc. 369, 142 N.Y.S. 548 (1913) (judgment for $1,949 affirmed where
defendant failed to cancel existing policies); Boyer v. State Farmers Mutual Hail Ins. Co.,
86 Kan. 442, 121 P. 329 (1912) (plaintiff recovered face amount of policy even though
agent delayed so long in submitting it that loss occurred before policy was issued); Duffy
v. Bankers Life Assn., 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913) (recovery in tort by insured's representative allowed where insured died during the month that agent delayed
forwarding application and first premium); AHi.eek v. Kean, 50 R.I. 405, 148 A. 324
(1930) (plaintiff recovered in assumpsit from gratuitous agent who misdescribed automobile he volunteered to insure).
144 Carr v. Maine Central R.R., 78 N.H. 502, 102 A. 532 (1917) (recovery allowed
in tort against railroad which delayed too long in filing shipper's claim for rebate); Kirby
v. Brown, Wheelock, Harris, Vought & Co., 229 App. Div. 155, 241 N.Y.S. 255 (1930),
(recovery allowed against real estate broker who promised gratuitously to submit bid on
property for plaintiff), reversed on other grounds, 255 N.Y. 274, 174 N.E. 652 (1931).
Accord: AGENCY RESTATEMENT §378, comment a, illustration 1 (1933); First National
Bank & Trust Co. v. Evans, 11 N.J. Misc. 19, 163 A. 667 (1932) (mortgagee who promised mortgagor to file proof of fire loss liable for not doing so); Condon v. Exton-Hall
Brokerage and Vessel Agency, 80 Misc. 369, 142 N.Y.S. 548 (1913) (defendant liable for
failing to cancel insurance policies as promised); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 103 W.Va.
574, 138 S.E. 381 (1927) (agent who failed to cancel insurance cannot escape liability
by proving his promise gratuitous); Feldmeyer v. Engelhart, 54 S.D. 81, 222 N.W. 598
(1928) (lack of diligence in procuring requested insurance~; Lusk-Harbison-Jones, Inc. v.
Universal Credit Co., 164 Miss. 693, 145 S. 623 (1933) (defendant liable for failure to
provide insurance it said was carried). Analogous cases include: Lough v. John Davis &
Co., 30 Wash. 204, 70 P. 491 (1902) (agent held liable in tort to third person where he
had assumed control of a building); Merchant's Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller, 135
Tenn. 187 at 196, 186 S.W. 87 (1916) (landlord liable in tort to third party where he
had promised lessee to repair). Contra: Thome v. Deas, 4 Johns. (N.Y.) 84 (1809);
Brawn v. Lyford, 103 Me. 362, 69 A. 544 (1907) (no contractual liability if promisor fails
to secure consent of insurance carrier to transfer of interests); Republic Thrift Syndicate
v. Atkinson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 21 S.W. (2d) 1102 (one attempting gratuitously to
obtain insurance for another but failing to do so not liable for pure nonfeasance); Quincy
& Co. Arbitrage Corp. v. Cities Service Co., 156 Misc. 83, 282 N.Y.S. 294 (1935) (one
who agrees voluntarily to offer shares of stock for sale, but fails to do so is not liable);
National Bank of Fayette County v. Valentich, 343 Pa. 132, 22 A. (2d) 724 (1941)
(failure to sell collateral as promised does not create liability).
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Some of the cases which illustrate the liability of the gratuitous
agent have already been discussed from the viewpoint of the bailment
analogy. They are equally fruitful, so far as promissory estoppel is
concerned, if they are examined from the viewpoint of principal and
agent.
Cases like Coggs v. Bernard and Siegel v. Spear & Co., for example,
are as likely to be decided in favor of the plaintiff on the ground of misfeasance145 as on the ground that the promisor induced the promisee
to rely on his promise to render specific service.146 The point to be
emphasized is that recovery of damages presupposes breach of an existing duty. The duty can arise out of a promise to perform it which is
purchased at a price; if promissory estoppel is employed it can arise
where a gratuitous promise induces action in reliance and injustice will
result from non-enforcement. Or it can be created by law as an incident
to a relationship that is found to exist between the parties. The duty to
use care which the law imposes on an agent in regard to his principal's
chattels does not depend on whether the agent is to· be paid for his
services. Rather, it depends on whether there is a principal-agent relationship; so, in regard to the duty a bailee owes his bailor. That the
promisor was to be paid for his services is some evidence of the relationship. Lack of payment will not prevent the relationship from arising.
Thus, in Siegel Spear & Co., one may view the promise to insure
as exchanged for permission to store plaintiff's goods or as a gratuitous
promise to render· a definite service. And the failure to insure can be
regarded as mishandling the goods. If the court finds that the defendant
has violated a duty, he responds in damages.
The gratuitous promise to render a specific service in connection
with the obtaining or maintaining of an insurance policy has been a
source of much litigation. Numerous cases impose liability on the
promisor because his promise induced the insured to stand by and not
protect his own interests.
In Maddock v. Riggs,1 47 the beneficiary of a fraternal insurance
policy recovered the amount that would have been due if defendantpromisor had remitted promptly the dues (premiums) which had been
paid to him by the insured-promisee. Defendant (also a member of the

v.

145 Discussed in Part I, 50 MICH. L. RBv. 639 at 665-674 (1952).
146 Other illustrative cases: Jenkins v. Bacon, 111 Mass. 373 (1873);

Kowing v.
Manly, 49 N.Y. 192 (1872).
147 106 Kan. 808, 190 P. 12 (1920). Accord: Criswell v. Riley, 5 Ind. App. 496, 30
N.E. 1101, 32 N.E. 814 (1892) (gratuitous procurement of insurance policy followed by
negligent failure to pay premium); Feldmeyer v. Engelhart, 54 S.D. 81, 222 N.W. 598
(1928).
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fraternal organization) had previously been an authorized collector of
dues. Insured had always promptly paid his dues to defendant. When
defendant ceased being an authorized collector insured still paid him
the monthly dues. Ordinarily, defendant remitted promptly, but in
October 1917, he was late in making payment. As a result, Maddock
was suspended. Reinstatement was refused unless insured had another
physical examination. Maddock was not informed of this and continued
to pay his monthly dues to Riggs who deposited them in a special trust
fund. When Maddock died in February 1918, he had not yet been
told of the suspension. The Kansas Supreme Court held Riggs for the
face amount of the policy.
Maddock Riggs appears to be a simple bailment case. But it is
more than that. There was no question of loss or damage to the subject
matter of the bailment-if this is a case of bailment. Indeed, the promisor still had the dues on deposit in the bank. Plaintiff recovered a suni
equal to the face amount of the policy, not just the amount of the deposit with interest.
When the court holds the promisor liable for such a sum, it goes
far beyond Coggs v. Bernard in attaching consequences to a gratuitous
promise. Promisor's continued acceptance of the money, his failure to
advise insured of the policy's cancellation (though he "couldn't bear to
tell him"), and promisee's reliance on performance, seem to be the
most important factors in the case. This promisor both expected and
induced the insured to rely on the promise. When he did so, the
promisor should bear the loss occasioned by his own misconduct.
It is the very element of foreseeability which, in a case like Maddock
v. Riggs, justifies a court in extracting damages from the gratuitous
promisor. The dues were paid to defendant so that he could forward
them to the fraternal insurance organization. In the beginning he received them as an official collector. Subsequently he may have accepted
them because of the fraternal bond between insured and himself. It
may even have been because of inertia or habit. Defendant knew that
if he failed to remit on time the policy would lapse. This could cause a
severe monetary loss. He could have escaped liability by declining to
accept further payments. When he did not decline, he should bear the
loss rather than insured or the beneficiary. Assessable damages should
depend on "those injuries that the defendant had reason to foresee
as a probable result of his breach" when the promise was made.148 This

v.

148 CoNTRAC'I'S RESTATEMENT §331(2). The application of the rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale to promissory estoppel is discussed in Boyer, "Promissory Estoppel: Requirements
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defendant could expect his non-performance to cause a monetary loss
equal to the face of the policy. That he should make that loss good does
not seem unreasonable.
Two recent cases from Mississippi furnish additional illustrations of
the liability of the gratuitous promisor. In one of them,149 a taxpayer
gave the tax collector a check in payment of taxes due. The collector
held the check for four days after receipt; by then the bank on which it
was drawn had closed its doors. Believing that a cause of action had been
stated, the court said, "But even should we hold that the appellee ( collector) was a mere gratuitous agent, nevertheless he will be liable to the
appellant (taxpayer) if it lost its money because of a failure by the
appellee to exercise that degree of care and diligence that he should
have exercised. This is in accord with practically all of the authorities
which hold, in effect, as set forth in Sec. 599, AL.I. Rest. Agency,
Tentative Draft No. 7."ir,o
The other Mississippi case is Brewer 11. Universal Credit Co.151
There defendant, assignee of an installment purchase-money conditional sales contract, repossessed plaintiff's automobile when his payments were delinquent. It agreed to store the car for thirty days and to
allow plaintiff that period in which to pay the past-due installments and
regain his car. It did not do so; instead, it sold the car to a third party.
In the ensuing action for damages, defendant obtained a directed verdict. On appeal the court reversed, holding that section 90 of the
Contracts Restatement applied and saying, "We are, therefore, not concerned with ... whether the agreement to hold the car for thirty days
... was an agreement supported by a valuable consideration. . . . It was
an agreement which was calculated to induce the promisee to expend
his efforts to meet the two installments within the thirty days, and he did
so ...."

These two cases could also have been decided on a bailment theory,
but the court elected to go beyond the narrow con:6.nes of misfeasance.
It :6.tted the Sunµower Compress case into the gratuitous agency mold
and the Brewer case into that of promissory estoppel.
Hammond 11. Hussey1 52 indicates the scope of the liability to which
and Limitations of the Doctrine," 98 Umv. PA. L. REv. 459 at 461-463, 485-488 (1950).
See CoRBIN, §208.
149 Sunflower

Compress Co. v. Clark, 165 Miss. 219, 144 S. 477, 145 S. 617 (1933).
at 231. Section 599 of Tentative Draft No. 7 became section 378, AGENCY
RESTATEMENT (1933).
151 191 Miss. 183 at 190, 192 S. 902 (1940).
1r;2 51 N.H. 40 (1871).
150Jd.
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one may subject himself by a gratuitous undertaking. Defendant promised the school board to examine candidates for admission to school
and truthfully to report their qualifications. Plaintiff qualified but defendant reported otherwise. The court permitted plaintiff to maintain
an action on the case. It relied on Coggs v. Bernard saying, "The analogy is obvious, and the principle involved and by the application of
which this case is determined, is, that-the confidence induced by undertaking any service for another is a sufficient legal consideration to
create a duty in the performance of it...."153
As remarked above, insurance litigation provides many illustrations
of the enforcement of gratuitous promises. One of the early cases is
Wilkinson v. Coverdale. 154 Lord Kenyon there held that if a person
gratuitously undertakes to obtain an insurance policy for another but
conducts himself so negligently in perfecting it that the promisee is not
able to recover on the policy when the property is thereafter destroyed,
case will lie for the promisor' s negligence.
Elam v. Smithdeal Realty and Investment Co.155 is a modem counterpart. The defendant gratuitously undertook to obtain automobile
insurance for plaintiff. He did procure a policy which was delivered to
plaintiff. Thereafter the car was damaged in an accident and it was
discovered that the issued policy did not cover such loss. On appeal,
nonsuit was reversed. In holding that a cause of action had been stated,
the court decided that consideration was not necessary where the agent
had tried to act as he had promised and that he was bound to use
ordinary care in so doing.
Whether the agent has attempted to procure additional insurance156
or has failed to effect a cancellation of existing policies,157 courts have
imposed liability. They have even permitted recovery, ~ometimes in
153 Id. at 50. The court also quoted from Parsons on Contracts to the effect that "if
a person makes a gratuitous promise, and then enters upon the performance of it, he is
held to a full execution of all he has undertaken." It is of this quotation that Professor
Williston wrote, "The quotation from Professor Parsons goes far beyond the rule stated in
Section 90, and if literally taken goes beyond anything that can be accepted." AMERICAN
LAw lNs'lTI"OT.E, REsTAT.EMENT OF THE LAw OF CoNTRACTs, Official Draft, Chapters 1-7,
appendix 297 (1928).
154Wilkinson v. Coverdale, 1 Esp. 75, 170 Eng. Rep. 284 (1793) (note, plaintiff
was subsequently nonsuited when he failed to prove the promise).
155 182 N.C. 599, 109 S.E. 632 (1921).
156 Baxter v. Jones, 6 ONT. L. REP. 360 (1903) (insurance agent gratuitously promised to place additional insurance and to notify other insurance carriers of the increase. He
neglected the noti£cation, thus making the new policy unenforceable).
157 Condon v. Exton-Hall Brokerage and Vessel Agency, 80 Misc. 369, 142 N.Y.S.
548 (1913). Accord: Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 103 W.Va. 574, 138 S.E. 381 (1927).
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tort and sometimes in contract, where the event intended to be insured
against occurs before the policy is issued. 158
Why is this liability imposed? The reason given often has an ethical
basis. One court said, "Defendant's conduct lulled the plaintiff into the
position of assuming defendant would carry out what it had undertaken to do, and if this defendant for the purpose either of retaining a
client or a premium, took the chance of continuing the policy by not
canceling it as directed, and as it undertook to do, it must bear the burden and pay the loss."159 Judge Cardozo stated the reason most aptly
when he wrote, "In such circumstances the defendant is not relieved
of liability because in so acting as agent he was serving without pay....
He entered upon the business of his agency, took out the promised policy and exacted money from his principal to make him whole for his
expense. He could not do these things in performance of the mandate,
and win exemption thereafter if performance was remiss or ineffective."1ao
Clearly, these courts have determined that on the facts presented
there had been a loss suffered by the promisee, that the activities ( or
even non-action) of promisor had caused the loss and that justice demands that the promisor be held. Such reasoning, clearly, is an application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to the specific £eld of agency.
In the agency cases discussed so far the gratuitous promisor has
either received something from the promisee or has begun to do something for him. But what if the promisor refuses to begin his promised
performance? Should he then be liable for breach of his gratuitous
promise? If the promisor is to be held liable, it should be on reasoning
more substantial than a fine distinction between misfeasance and non158 Recovery in contract: Boyer v. 'State Farmers Mutual Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442,
121 P. 329 (1912) (agent delayed so long in forwarding premium note and application
for hail insurance that crop was destroyed before policy issued. The agent "was under a
duty to do something. He did nothing"); AfHeck v. Kean, 50 R.I. 405, 148 A. 324 (1930)
(plaintiff recovered in assumpsit against gratuitous agent who had misdescribed automobile
intended to be covered in policy). Recovery in tort: Duffy v. Bankers Life Ins. Assn., 160
Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913) (recovery in tort by intended beneficiary against agent
when insured died during month that agent delayed forwarding application and first
premium).
159Condon v. Exton-Hall Brokerage and Vessel Agency, 80 Misc. 369 at 376, 142
N.Y.S. 548 (1913).
160Barile v. Wright, 256 N.Y. 1 at 5, 175 N.E. 351 (1931). Accord: Warrener v.
Federal Land Bank, 266 Ky. 668, 99 S.W. (2d) 817 (1936) [citing AGENCY REsTATE·
MENT §378 (1933)]; Soule v. Union Bank, 45 Barb. lll, 30 How. Pr. 105 (N.Y. 1865);
Evan L. Reed Mfg. Co. v. Wurts, 187 ill. App. 378 (1914).
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feasance. 161 There must have been a breach of duty. Was there a duty
owed to the promisee by the gratuitous promisor?
Consider the cases of the railroad company that failed to file a
rebate claim for a shipper,1 62 the real estate broker who failed to hand
in a written bid at a property sale,1 63 and the mortgagee who, with the
fire insurance policy in his possession, promises the mortgagor to file
proper proof of loss but does not do so.164
The acceptance of the claim papers can be considered as tantamount
to a bailment; so might the acceptance of the written bid which is to be
submitted at the real estate sale. In both instances promisor receives
from promisee documents without which the promised performance can
not be given. It is possible, therefore, to treat such examples as illustrative only of the bailment rule on misfeasance. On the other hand,
one may treat them as more than that, as demonstrating the creation of
liability based on a gratuitous undertaking with the acceptance of the
documents evidencing the agreement but not essential to its enforcement.
Will it affect the result if the promisor is already in possession of
· all the papers necessarily connected with the prosecution of promisee's
claim? Illustrative is the instance where the promisor agrees to have
indorsements made or claims filed on insurance policies in his care at
the time. Should the promisor be held liable if damage is caused to the
promisee by reasonable reliance on the promise? In Brawn v. Lyford,1 615
the promisee was denied recovery of the amount of the policy when
promisor failed to perform his gratuitous agreement to have the insurance transferred when the property was sold to plaintiff. The reason
given by the court was lack of benefit to the promisor-the injury suffered. by plaintiff was overlooked. Save by enfor~ing this promise,
plaintiff's expectations could not be protected. The contrary result has
161 That a similar problem arises in the Torts £eld, see PROSSER, TonTs §33 (1941):
" •.• But in all these cases the courts have been quick to £nd some basis to hold that the
conduct is after all misfeasance: failure to heat a building becomes mismanagement of a
boiler; and an omission to repair a gas pipe is treated as misfeasance in the distribution of
gas ••••"
162Carr v. Maine Central R.R., 78 N.H. 502, 102 A. 532 (1917) (recovery allowed
in tort for negligence, but as has been pointed out, "the only negligence was a neglect to
keep a promise," CoRBIN, §207).
163 Kirby v. Brown, Wheelock, Harris, Vought & Co., Inc., 229 App. Div. 155, 241
N.Y.S. 255 (1930) (recovery allowed), reversed on other grounds, 255 N.Y. 274, 174
N.E. 632 (1931). Accord: AGENCY RBsTATBMBNT §378, comment a, illustration 1 (1933).
164 Recovery allowed: First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Evans, 11 N.J. Misc. 19 at
20, 163 A. 667 (1932); Contra: Brawn v. Lyford, 103 Me. 362, 69 A. 544 (1907).
165 103 Me. 362, 69 A. 544 (1907).

882

MicmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

been reached in New Jersey1° 6 in a case in which the mortgagee after
promising the mortgagor to have the policy "endorsed in such a manner
'to see that the interest of every one would be properly protected,'"
had only its own interest protected. The New Jersey court in overruling
a motion to strike based its decision on Thorne v. Deas and held that a
case of misfeasance had been stated.
If something tangible is handed over to the promisor at the time of
the promise, there is then provided additional evidence tending to
prove the promise. But the presence or absence of such evidence neither
proves nor disproves the fact of reliance or the fact of harm. The elements of deliberateness and foreseeability are more readily proved in
the bailment cases than they are in instances where the promisor does
not take possession of a chattel at the time he makes the promise. As
great an injustice may be done to a promisee who relies upon a gratuitous promise to effect insurance and then £.nds that he is without a
remedy, as will be caused a charity or an occupier of land who incur
liabilities or make expenditures in reliance on a donor's gratuitous
promise. Recovery should be allowed in both instances, not denied in
the former.
Section 378 of the Agency Restatement exemplifies the basic promissory estoppel doctrine in a particular field. Cases substantiating the
principle embodied in that section indicate a basis for liability in contract for failure to perform a gratuitous promise as well as in tort. Thus,
they break down the older view that either consideration for the promise or misfeasance in the performance of a gratuitous act is essential to
liability. Instead, the reliance element is stressed. The gratuitous agent
should be held because he has "injected himself into the affairs of
another by his undertaking or promising, by which reliance has been
induced."167
Whether or not he actually began performance should not be the
controlling factor. The question should be whether his failure to perform has caused harm to one who has been induced to rely upon his
promise to render a gratuitous service. If it has, the promisor should
respond in damages, if that is the only way to avoid injustice to the
promisee. The modem agency cases so hold. When they do so, they
are disregarding the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance.
166 First

National Bank & Trust Co. v. Evans, 11 N.J. Misc. 19 at 20, 163 A. 667

(1932).
167 AMERICAN I.Aw INsnTOTI!, R:ssTAT.BMJlNT OF AGENCY,

(1932).

Tentative Draft No. 7, 249
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At the same time they are furnishing specific precedents which validate
the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

E. Miscellany
The precedents for promissory estoppel which have been examined
thus far (charitable subscriptions, promises to make gifts of land, and
gratuitous bailment and agency) are conventionally recognized as furnishing justification for the doctrine. There are at least three other
factual situations which are worthy of study for their contribution to
promissory estoppel. Included are (I) bonus and pension claims, (2)
waiver situations and (3) rent reductions. In all of them the invariable defense to enforcement is a plea that the promise sought to be enforced was gratuitous. But enforcement frequently occurs. When it
does, justification can most often be found in the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.
·

I. Bonus and Pension Plans. Wholly aside from questions of labor
policy, economics and management, cases dealing with attempts to
enforce bonus and pension plans present interesting problems to one
who studies changing concepts in the field of contract law.
Is a promise to pay a pension or bonus enforceable? Has the employer promised to confer a mere gratuity, or has he bought faithful
service for which he must pay? Some cases take the view that promises
to pay pensions create no rights, that they involve only gratuities,168
saying "Such offer was based on motive and not on consideration and
cannot be enforced in court."169
Everyone is aware of the conB.ict of authority regarding the enforceability of a promise to pay an additional sum for services the promisee
is already under a duty to perform.170 But the right of an employee to
recover a pension or bonus runs afoul of this problem only when the
employee has already contracted to serve for the specific time or perform the exact service for which it was promised. If the employee is
168 Dolge v. Dolge, 70 App. Div. 517, 75 N.Y.S. 386 (1902); Russell v. H. W. JohnsManville Co. of California, 53 Cal. App. 572, 200 P. 668 (1921); W1tusToN, §130 B.
See CORBIN, §153.
169 Shear Co. v. Harrington, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 266 S.W. 554 at 557.
170 CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT §§76(a), 77; WILUSTON, §§130, 130A; CoRBIN, §175.
The relation of this problem to promissory estoppel is discussed infra pp. 892 to 898, in
connection with Rent Reductions.
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free to leave the service, he is free to contract to remain and the prom- .
ise to pay the bonus has ample consideration.171 Many of the courts
which allow recovery by the employee hold that the promise to pay the
bonus or pension constitutes an offer for a unilateral contract and that
when the employee, after notice of the promise, continues to work for
the employer he thereby accepts the offer.172
In numerous instances the employee was induced to remain on the
job because of his reliance upon the promise of the bonus or pension.
The benefits accruing to an employer who is thus able to reduce his
labor turnover are clear.173 Because of that benefit, there is a tendency
on the part of the courts to try to enforce these promises. This tendency
is exemplified in statements such as these: "To allow the employer in
such a case to repudiate liability on the ground stated [that since the
pension plan was established by a corporation by-law, third parties
could assert no rights thereunder] would come perilously near conniving at . . . a fraud"; 174 "It [the evidence] establishes that plaintiff
relied upon the promises of defendant, and continued in its employment ... and that ... he declined employment elsewhere ...";175 "To
disregard the positive promises . . . is to brand the plan as a deceptive
gesture of ostensible generosity. . . ."176 These statements show the
possibility of deciding such cases on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel when reliance is coupled with the need to avoid injustice.
Indeed, two cases from Pennsylvania have relied expressly on that
doctrine in deciding that promises to pay pensions are enforceable. The
first of these, Langer v. Superior Steel Corporation,1 77 found the court
sustaining an action in assumpsit wherein plaintiff sought to hold his
former employer to a promise to pay him "$ I 00 per month as long as
you live and preserve your present attitude of loyalty to the company
and its officers and are not employed in any competitive occupation."
The Common Pleas Court had sustained questions of law raised
by the defendant. The real issue was whether the case involved "a
171 Kerbaugh, Inc. v. Gray, (2d Cir. 1914) 212 F. 716; Haag v. Rogers, 9 Ga. App.
650, 72 S.E. 46 (1911); J. L. Phillips & Co, v. Hudson, 9 Ga. App. 779, 72 S.E. 178
(1911).
172Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 137 N.W. 769 (1912); Fuller Co.
v. Brown, (4th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 672; Roberts v. Mays Mills, 184 N.C. 406, 114
S.E. 530 (1922); Scott v. J. F. Duthie and Co., 125 Wash. 470, 216 P. 853 (1923);
Tilbert v. Eagle Lock Co., 116 Conn. 357, 165 A. 205 (1933); Schofield v. Zion's Co-op.
Mercantile Institution, 85 Utah 281, 39 P. (2d) 342 (1934); Wilson v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 48 Ohio App. 450, 194 N.E. 441 (1934); Mahley & Carew Co. v. Borden, 129
Ohio St. 375, 195 N.E. 697 (1935); Psutka v. Michigan Alkali Co., 274 Mich. 318, 264
N.W. 385 (1936).
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gratuitous promise or an enforceable contract." Judge Baldridge held
that the promise could be enforced as a unilateral contract or on the
theory of promissory estoppel.1 78
Considered as an offer for a unilateral contract, we may justify the
holding because the plaintiff's refraining from working with defendant's
competitors is a distinct advantage and benefit. If defendant refrains
from working for others, there is likewise a detriment to him. If it is
assumed that the promise to pay the monthly pension was exchanged
for plaintiff's refraining there certainly is a bargained-for consideration
for the promise.179
It is the promissory estoppel aspect of the case, though, that is of
more interest. The court Hatly said the contract was enforceable on the
theory of promissory estoppel.1 80 As authority, it cited section 90 of
the Contracts Restatement and Ricketts v. Scothern.181 The court took
pains to state that not every gratuitous promise on which one has relied
will be enforced, but only those where a detriment of a definite and
substantial character has been incurred.
The other Pennsylvania case is Trexler's Estate182 which arose in
Orphan's Court. Deceased had, for some time before his death, paid
pensions to employees who had previously worked for him for many
years. The question for decision was whether the promises to pay pensions were enforceable against the estate. The court held that they
were.183
The opinion contains a very complete discuss~on of section 90 of
the Restatement and relies upon it as authority for enforcing the promise. The employer's promise to pay the pension induced in the minds
173Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 137 N.W. 769 (1912).
174 Id. at 521.
175 Fuller Co. v. Brown, ( 4th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 672 at 675.
110 Psutka v. Michigan Alkali Co., 274 Mich. 318 at 320, 264 N.W. 385 (1936).
177 Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. 579, 161 A. 171 (1932), reversed
(on ground that president did not have authority to make the promise sued on) 318 Pa.
490, 178 A. 490 (1935).
178 See PA'lTERSON AND GOBLE, CASBS ON CoNTR.ACTs, 2d ed., 439 (1941), Note,
''Employee Bonus Cases." See also Fuller, ''Williston on Contracts," 18 N.C.L. RBv. l
at 6 (1939).
179WILLISTON, §112.
180 Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. 597 at 584, 161 A. 571 (1932).
181 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365, 366 (1898).
182 27 Pa. D. & C. 4 (1936).
183 The executors were not directly opposing the claims made by the superannuated
employees but, being of the opinion that there was no legal basis for the claim, required
an order of court before making payment.
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of the employees a sense of security. It was the injustice of suddenly
stopping the payments that appealed most strongly to the court. To
avoid this injustice the court enforced the promise saying, "All the circumstances show that when General Trexler made the promise, he
intended to be bound. Not once during his lifetime did he attempt to
recall it. . . . The promise became a solemn covenant between him and
the claimants. It was not based on the historical and traditional term
of consideration ... why should the law be astute and bring into the
case highly strained technical principles of law requiring consideration,
to invalidate a contract which the parties themselves understood to be
complete and valid? General Trexler in his lifetime never welshed on
his promise; why should his estate?"184
The general tendency in recent bonus and pension cases is to enforce the promise against the employer. This is done even though the
announcement of the plan contains a statement that no legal rights are
created and there is a stipulation of non-enforceability.185 The cases
raise interesting technical questions in the £.eld of consideration. Normally, one will doubt whether there is an intent to make a bargain. But
there is no doubt that the promise is relied upon by the employee over
a considerable period of time and that his subsequent course of conduct
is influenced by the expectations aroused by the promise. It is only
the employee who has served for many years who qualifies for any substantial pension. When his reliance is coupled with the injustice that
will result from not enforcing the promise it is easy to understand why
the courts impose liability. Those that do so and justify their action
by the doctrine of promissory estoppel demonstrate the role which
reliance is playing in the modem enforcement of promises. They likewise indicate the wide basis for the adoption of that doctrine.
Akin to the pension and bonus cases are instances like Ricketts v.
Scothern. 186 In that case, as is well known, a grandfather, telling his
granddaughter that "None of my grandchildren work and you don't
have to," gave her a demand promissory note for $2,000 bearing 6%
interest. In reliance on the promise evidenced by the note, she quit her
184 Trexlex's
185 It is not

Estate, 27 Pa. D. & C. 4 at 16, 17 (1936).
within the province of this article to consider the effect of a stipulation
denying legal effect in an employer's voluntary pension, bonus or death benefit plan. On
this see comment by Professor Grismore, 34 MicH. L. REv. 700 (1936), and FuLLER,
BASIC CoNTRACT LAW 381 (1947).
1s6 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898).
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employment. Thereafter he paid the interest for one year, and excused
his failure to do so the second year. After his death, suit was brought
against his executor to recover the amount of the note. The defense
was want of consideration.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed a judgment for plaintiff
saying, "... Ordinarily such promises are not enforceable even when
put in the form of a promissory note. . . . But it has often been held
that an action on a note given to a church, college, or other like institutions, on the faith of which money has been expended or obligations
incurred, could not be successfully defended on the ground of want of
consideration. . . . The true reason is the preclusion of the defendant,
under the doctrine of estoppel to deny the consideration. When the
payee changes his position to his disadvantage in reliance on the promise, a right of action does arise. . . . Having intentionally influenced
the plaintiff to alter her position for the worse on the faith of the note
being paid when due, it would be grossly inequitable to permit the
maker, or his executor, to resist payment on the ground that the promise was given without consideration."187
Ricketts 11. Scothern appears to be one of the earliest cases embodying the rationale of promissory estoppel. Even a cursory reading of it
shows the importance the court attaches to detrimental action in reliance on the promise. The court in emphasizing this element helped
pave the way for the express formulation of the doctrine some thirty6.ve years later.188
It will be observed that Ricketts 11. Scothern did not involve the
delivery of a chattel to, or the beginning of performance of any service
by, the promisor. Yet the court enforced the promise. In so doing, it
extended the scope of contractual liability. Those who agree with this
court must ask themselves whether the lack of delivery of something
tangible requires a decision of non-liability on breach of the promise.
If a sister-in-law, in reliance on a promise to "let her have a place
to raise her family" abandons a homestead and moves her family some
sixty miles, should the brother-in-law be liable in damages when he
refuses to provide her with a home?189 If not, the holding must be dis187 Ricketts v. Scothern, 57 Neb. 51 at 54, 77 N.W. 365 (1898).
188 A modem application of Ricketts v. Scothern is found in Fluckey v. Anderson, 132
Neb. 664, 273 N.W. 41 (1937), which cites §90 of the Contracts Restatement and the
principal case as authority for allowing recovery on a gratuitous promise.
189Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845) (denied liability).
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tinguished from Devecmon v. Shaw- 90 where a nephew who spent
money in reliance on his uncle's promise to pay the expenses of a trip
to Europe was held to have stated a cause of action in contract when
he recited these facts. The Maryland court said it was not enforcing
a gratuitous promise and that "it was a burden incurred at the request
of the other party and was certainly a sufficient consideration for a
promise to pay." Going to Europe could be sought by the promisor as
the exchange for a promise to pay a sum equal to the cost of the trip,
but one may well doubt whether there was any intent here to make a
bargain. As has been said, "The same thing, therefore, stated as the
condition of a promise may or may not be consideration, according as
a reasonable man would or would not understand that the performance
of the condition was requested as the price or exchange for the
promise."191
The obvious injustice of the Kirksey decision illustrates pointedly
the difficulties inherent in a philosophy which utilizes the bargain
concept as the only source in explaining the creation of contract liability. Much more preferable is a view which recognizes reliance as a
second, even though subsidiary, basis for the enforcement of promises.
This the pension and bonus cases do. 192

2. Waiver. The term "waiver" has a number of meanings in
our contract law. 193 It often happens that contractual liabilities are
made contingent upon the performance of a condition. If claimant's
right is subject to an implied or express condition, inquiry must be
made to determine whether the condition has been performed. Unless
it has, or that performance excused, claimant's right is not perfect. "The
possible excuses for failure to perform such conditions are few." 194
Included among the few is waiver. Williston concludes that, in its
strict sense, waiver is to be defined as "A promise or permission express
or implied in fact, supported only by action in reliance thereon, to
190 69 Md. 199 at 201, 14 A. 464
191 WILLISTON, §112.
192 WILLISTON, §130B, discusses

(1888).

the bonus and pension problem in a general way.
He justifies enforcement on one of two theories where the promise is not made to obtain
a service already due. The first ground is that there is an offer for a unilateral contract that
is accepted by continuing to work. The other ground is promissory estoppel.
198 WILLISTON, §679, enumerates at least nine of them.
194 WILLISTON, §676, lists seven of them. Included are (1) impossibility, (2) prevention by promisor, (3) waiver, (4) new contract, (5) acceptance of defective performance, (6) anticipatory breach, and (7) forfeiture and penalty.
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excuse performance in the future of a condition or to give up a defense
not yet arisen, which would otherwise prevent recovery on an obligation."105 It is in this narrower sense that the word "waiver" is employed
here.
Now examine this narrower meaning to determine the essential
elements of a "waiver." There must be an indication that the performance on which the obligation depends is excused. This indication or
manifestation may be embodied in a promise or in a permission, express or implied. It must apply to a performance not yet due or to a
defense that has not yet become available. And the performance or
defense must be such as to defeat the obligation. In a sense, we have
here a present surrender of something that is not yet available to the
one who gives the promise or permission. So much for the first element.
The second element is action in reliance on the promise or permission
by the one to whom it is given. If these elements concur the promise
or permission is usually binding though without consideration, for the
injustice that results in such reliance ordinarily is obvious.
Sometimes it is said that this situation will constitute an "estoppel."196 There has only been a representation as to future action not as
to presently existing fact, 197 so the situation should be catalogued as
one of promissory estoppel. It is properly so placed because, even
though no consideration is paid for the promise or permission, it is held
binding when detrimental action in reliance upon it has occurred and
restoration of the status quo is impossible.
Justification for such holdings is readily found when one considers
the ethics of the situation. To permit a party to a contract to induce
the other to continue preparations for performance in reliance upon a
promise to accept regardless of the time performance is tendered, and
to permit him then to refuse acceptance and defend on the ground that
the condition was not performed, is unjust. Particularly is this so in
the "strict" waiver cases where at the time the waiver occurs it is still
possible for the performer to fulfill the condition but the representation
induces him not to do so.
195 WILLISTON, §679. Accord: Colbath v. H. B. Stebbins Lumber Co., 127 Me. 406,

144 A. 1 (1929).
196 GmsMoRE, PRINCIPLI!s oF THB LAw OF CoNTRACTs §161 (1947), calls it a "pseudo
estoppel'' and explains the result of the cases on the basis of promissory estoppel.
197 GRISMORE, §161; WILLISTON, §689.
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Classic illustrations of the application of the doctrine of waiver, as
used in the strict sense, include the following:
I. Enforcement of promises to accept performance after the due
date where the promise is made before that date and the promisee, in
reliance thereon, makes his tender within the extended time.198
2. ·Performance of construction work on an oral order though the
original contract required written change orders as a condition for imposing liability.199
3. Promises to waive presentment and notice of dishonor of negotiable instruments made before maturity become effective when made
by the person entitled to such notice. 200
4. Enforcement of promises to subscribe to corporate stock despite
non-compliance with the condition that a call be made when subscriber
has indicated that he will not require the call. 201
Characteristic of these illustrations is the fact that in each instance
the promisee has, in reliance upon the promise not to insist upon the
performance of the condition, neglected or failed to perform it. Enforcement of the promise to "waive" the condition can be justified only
on the basis of promissory estoppel. 202 Moreover, unless the promisee
has acted in reliance upon the undertaking to waive the condition, there
is no reason why the promisor should not be permitted to plead failure
of the conditon as a defense. If there has been no detrimental change
in position, the promisee is not harmed by requiring him to perform
according to "the letter of the contract." For these reasons, it is usually
held that waivers may be recalled and performance of the condition
insisted upon if this is done before a change in position has occurred
and if an opportunity is given the promisee to perform the reinstated
condition.203
19s Shallenberger v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 223 Pa. 220, 72 A. 500 (1908);
Parish Mfg. Corp. v. Martin-Parry Corp., 293 Pa. 422, 143 A. 103 (1928); WILLISTON,
§§689, 856, lists numerous cases.
199 Saliba v. Zarthar, 282 Mass. 558, 185 N.E. 367 (1933); Causte v. Board of Essex
County, 9 N.J. Misc. 2, 152 A. 640 (1930); Belt v. Stover, 157 Okla. 176, 11 P. (2d)
519 (1932); Douglass and Varnum v. Morrisville, 89 Vt. 393, 95 A. 810 (1915); Davis
v. La Crosse Hospital Assn., 121 Wis. 579, 99 N.W. 351 (1904).
200 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, §§109, 110, and Ill; WILLISTON, §1186;
Citizen's Nat. Bank v. Jennings, 33 Ga. App. 659, 127 S.E. 657 (1925) (waiver implied
from previous dealings); Orthwein v. Nolker, 290 Mo. 284, 234 S.W. 787 (1921)
(waiver by agreement).
201 WILLISTON, §689; Coox, ConPoRATioNs, 8th ed., §105 (1923).
202WILLISTON, §689; GRISMORE, §161.
203 CoNTRACTS RBsTATBMllNT §88 (promise to perform a duty in spite of the nonperformance of a condition), §297 (excuse of condition by waiver), §308 (waiver of the
effect of a condition subsequent), and §311 (re-establishment of a time-limit for performance). See WILLISTON, §689, note 14, for a collection of cases.
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Similar to the problem just considered is the one posed by the decision in Hetchler v. American Life Ins. Co.204 The insurance company
informed the insured that his policy had a value which would give him
paid-up insurance until a specific date. The insured took no steps to
procure other insurance. When he died before the date mentioned by
the company it sought to defend a suit by the beneficiary by showing
that there had been a mistake in figuring the date to which the paid-up
insurance would extend. It was not permitted to do so and the company was held liable. Here there could be only one correct answer to
the question of how much paid-up insurance could be obtained on
this particular policy. The deceased might have determined the date
himself or had others do so, though this would involve solution of a
technical statistical problem. The insurer just believed what the insurance company told him. It appears from the case that he took no action
to obtain insurance elsewhere. But it does not appear that he could
have done so even though he had wished to have another policy written.
The case, therefore, may be said to lack an essential element for the
application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel: the element of harm
resulting from action in reliance on the promise. If he could not have
obtained other insurance, his reliance caused him no hurt.
If liability is to be imposed in such cases, it rests on a theory which
emphasizes representation instead of exchange or reliance. Perhaps the
case also indicates that estoppel will be more readily recognized as an
excuse for a breach of condition than is estoppel as the basis for liability on a new promise. It may well be that courts are more often justified
in requiring performance of a promise despite the failure of a condition,
where the failure is due to promissor's statement that performance will
not be required, than they are in creating liability where none existed
before. It may seem more just to require enforcement of a promise to
excuse than of a promise to create a legal relationship, but it is submitted that exactly the same elements should be weighed before decision in either case. This the Hetchler case failed to do.
Analogous are cases involving waiver of the statute of limitations.
Care must be taken when considering this category to distinguish between instances of true bargain and those which actually involve only
a promissory estoppel. If restraint in suing on a claim is bargained for
as the exchange for promisor's promise or performance there is no occasion to invoke the doctrine. 2011
204 266 Mich. 608, 254 N.W. 221 (1934).
205 Lewis v. Siegman, 135 Ore. 660 at 663,

296 P. 51 (1931), "An agreement by
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In the case of "unbargained-for reliance," 206 though, unless resort
is had to the doctrine of promissory estoppel, one is hard pressed to
explain and justify the result of the cases.207 When this is done, a
rational basis for decision is provided for courts which desire to avoid
the injustices that arise from a strict application of conventional contract
rules relating to bargains.
3. Rent Reductions. If the lessor and the lessee during the term
agree to a reduction in the rent and the tenant pays the smaller sum,
may the landlord later recover the difference between the amount paid
and the rent speci6.ed in the lease?
In support of the landlord's claim it may be said that the payment
of the lesser sum by the tenant is not a "legal detriment'' to him for he
has only paid less than he owes; no "legal benefit" accrued to.the lessor
in accepting less than was due. 208 Hence, there is no consideration to
support the promise.
If the debtor merely does less than he is already bound to do by his
bargain, should acceptance of such performance prevent the creditor
from obtaining the balance originally tlue him? The weight of authority in England209 and in the United States210 is to the effect that neither
part payment of a debt presently due nor a promise to make such payment is such consideration as will discharge the debt. The creditor may
still collect the unpaid balance by suit.
The requirement of legal detriment to the one who pays or promises to pay as essential tb the enforcement of a promise to discharge a
a creditor to forbear • • . and an actual forbearance . . . is a good consideration • • • but a
mere forbearance without such a promise, is not." Utica Insurance Co. v. Bloodgood, 4
Wend. 652 (N.Y. 1830); Gaylord v. Van Loan, 15 Wend. 308 (N.Y. 1836).
206 FuLLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAw 363 (1947), so uses the term to describe the fact
situation involved.
207 Illustrative cases of the application of the doctrine include: Armstrong v. Levan,
109 Pa. 177, l A. 204 (1885) (defendant estopped to plead statute of limitation because
he had promised plaintiff that he would make a loss good if suit was delayed); Holman v.
Omaha & C.B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 117 Iowa 268, 90 N.W. 833 (1902) (reliance on a
promise not to plead the statute; defendant estopped); Renackowshy v. Board of Water
Commissioners of Detroit, 122 Mich. 613, 81 N.W. 581 (1900) (plaintiff can meet
defense of statute of limitations by showing his reliance on a promise not to plead it).
Accord: Stevens v. Turlington, 186 N.C. 191, 119 S.E. 210 (1923); Ellingson v. State
Bank of Hoffman, 182 Minn. 510, 234 N.W. 867 (1931) (mortgagees estopped from
asserting mortgage against purchaser who bought in reliance on assurance that it would
be released); Lacy v. Wozencraft, 188 Okla. 19, 105 P. (2d) 781 (1940); In re Campbell, Campbell v. Corporation of America, (9th Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 197, cert. den.
308 U.S. 593, 60 S.Ct. 1931 (1939).
2osw1LLISTON, §120; ANsoN, §§138-140; CoRBIN, §175; GrusMoRE, §§65, 66 (1947);
CoNTRACTs REsTATEMENT §76a.
209 Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884).
210Bender v. Been, 78 Iowa 283, 43 N.W. 216 (1889); Levine v. Blumenthal, 117
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liquidated claim has been criticized by a few courts211 as well as by
writers in legal periodicals.212
An implicit assumption of those courts which follow the weight of
authority is that an obligation, once created, can be discharged only by
performance, by an agreement under seal, or by a promise supported
by a bargained-for equivalent.213 However, there seems to be no inherent characteristic of a liquidated debt which demands that any one
of these be present to accomplish an effectual extinguishment of the
debt. It may be argued that "a chose in action, in the language of the
common law, lies in grant and not in livery"214 or that "as it is their
(the parties') agreement which binds them, so by their agreement may
they be loosed."215 And the logic of such an argument is difficult to
overcome unless one is willing to concede that the law should treat the
extinguishment of an existing obligation as different from the creation
of such an obligation.
If a creditor agrees to forgive the entire claim in return for the
payment of a part thereof and then sues to recover the balance, the
debtor might offer two defenses: (I) that the creditor has agreed not
to sue for the balance, and (2) that the original debt has been forgiven.
If the £.rst defense is raised the inquiry will be as to whether consideration or an acceptable substitute therefor was present. If the creditor defends on the second ground the case may turn on whether there
has been an effective gift. Both of these defenses arise in connection
with promises to reduce rents. A creditor should be able to forgive his
debtor and a landlord his tenant. The question may be whether he had
that intention or whether he was making the best of a bad bargain
\vhen he accepts the lesser sum.
Occasional decisions are found to the effect that acceptance of a
reduced rent in accordance with the landlord's oral or written promise
to accept it discharges the tenant's obligation to pay the larger stipulated
N.J.L. 23, 186 A. 457, affd., 117 N.J.L. 426, 189 A. 54 (1937). Cases are collected in
20 L.R.A. 785; 11 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1018; L.R.A. 1917A, 719; 119 A.L.R. 1123.
211 Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N.Y. 164; 168, 26 N.E. 351 (1891); Clayton v. Clark, 74
Miss. 499, 510, 21 S. 565, 22 S. 189 (1896) ("••• absurd, irrational, unsupported by
reason •••"); Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N.H. 358 at 377, 68 A. 325 (1907) ("..• contrary to
the fact at the present time, • • • is based upon misconception, is not founded in reason
•••"); Rye v. Phillips, 203 Minn. 567 at 569, 282 N.W. 459 (1938) ("••• one of the
relics of antique law"). See CoRllIN, §175, for additional citations.
2 12 Ames, "Two Theories of Consideration," 12 HARv. L. RBv. 515 at 524 (1899);
Corbin, "New Contract By Debtor To Pay His Pre-existing Debt," 27 YALE L.J. 535
(1918); Person, "The Rule In Foakes v. Beer," 31 YALE L.J. 15 (1921).
218WrLLISTON, §120, makes the same assumption. See, GmsMoRB, §66; ANsoN, §413.
214 WILLISTON, §120.
2115 ANsoN, §411.
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sum.216 The diverse justifications for such decisions range from a theory
of a completed gift to a waiver and even to the discovery of a legally
sufficient bargained-for exchange. 217 Other courts explain their decisions
by saying that the parties have made a settlement:218 of unforeseen contingencies. Unexpected changes due to an economic depression have
also been accepted as justifying a modification of a rental agreement. 219
As already indicated, however, many courts refuse to regard the
landlord's promise as preventing his recovery of the difference between
what was originally due and what was accepted in discharge of the
obligation. 220 They so rule because there is said to be no consideration
for the landlord's promise to accept the lesser sum in satisfaction.
To ground a recovery for the landlord on the automatic application
of an anachronistic "peculiarity of English law"221 is to overlook the
question of whether any accompanying circumstances should impel the
courts to hold the landlord to his promise. The mechanical application
of a rule of law never assures the attainment of a fair result. And the
rule of Foakes 11. Beer is only "mechanical jurisprudence'' in action. In
many instances there are facts present which might well lead to the
enforcement of such a promise even though it is admitted that the
landlord received no price therefor. The inquiry should be directed to
ascertaining whether the landlord's promise induced a substantial
change of position by the tenant and whether injustice will result if
the promise, gratuitous though it may be, is not enforced. If the tenant
has made such a change, the courts may very justly decide that the lack
of a bargain equivalent does not prevent enforcement of the promise.
An illustration demonstrates the effective use to which the doctrine
of promissory estoppel may be put in such a situation. In Fried 11.
216WrLLISTON, §120: "Such a result, however, cannot be made consistent with accepted principles of consideration."
217 Julian v. Gold, 214 Cal. 74, 3 P. (2d) 1009 (1932) (completed gift); Hurlbut v.
Butte-Kansas Co., 120 Kan. 205, 243 P. 324 (1926) (voluntary relinquishment of a
known right); Bowman v. Wright, 65 Neb. 661, 91 N.W. 580, 92 N.W. 580 (1902)
(lessee's remaining in possession is something not required by lease and constitutes consideration for promise to reduce rent).
21s Lindeke Land Co. v. Kalman, 190 Minn. 601, 252 N.W. 650 (1934).
210 Liebreich v. Tyler State Bank & Trust Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 100 S.W.
(2d) 152
220Torrey v. Adams, 254 Mass. 22, 149 N.E. 618 (1925); Davis v. Newcombe Oil
Co., 203 Minn. 295, 281 N.W. 272 (1938); Levine v. Blumenthal, II7 N.J.L. 23, 186
A. 457 (1936); Haynes Auto Repair Co. v. Wheels, ll5 N.J.L. 447, 180 A. 836 (1935).
221 According to Sir George Jessel, " ••• a creditor might accept anything in satisfaction of a debt except a less amount of money. He might take a horse, or a canary, or a
tomtit if he chose, and that was accord and satisfaction; but by a most extraordinary peculiarity of English law he could not take 19 s. 6 d. in the pound." Couldrey v. Bartrum,
19 Ch.D. 394 at 399 (1881).
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Fisher2 22 the plaintiff (landlord) had leased a store building to Fisher
and one Brill who, as partners, operated a Horist shop on the premises.
Fisher decided to withdraw and go into a business of his own (this was
agreeable to Brill) but did not want to do so unless he could secure a
release from the partnership obligations. When inquiry was made,
plaintiff said he "was perfectly satisfied if they [Brill & Son] assumed
the balance of the lease, as far as I am concerned, just forget about it."
Later plaintiff said, "... if it is going to help you get started in business,
I release you...." Accordingly, Fisher left the partnership and started
a new business of his own in a different town. Brill paid the rent to
Fried for about eighteen months and then failed in business. Judgment
by confession for the amount due under the lease was entered against
Fisher and Brill. Then, on Fisher's application, the judgment was
opened and a jury found against the landlord. On appeal the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in an opinion by Stem, J., affirmed the judgment, resting its decision squarely on section 90 of the Contracts Restatement.223
Analysis shows that the doctrine furnishes a justifiable basis for
this decision. The landlord announced that he was abandoning his
right to collect rent from Fisher under the lease. He knew at the time
Fisher would rely upon the promise-Fisher had said that he was going
to start a new business if Fried acquitted him of liability under the
partnership lease. Furthermore, Fisher did begin the new business.
This latter action necessarily involved his assuming liabilities and making expenditures which otherwise he would not have made. To refuse
enforcement of the landlord's promise will result in injustice and hardship to Fisher. The only way to avoid that injustice is to enforce the
promise. This the court rightly did, for all of the elements of promissory
estoppel were present.224
Rent reduction promises have often been enforced. But the theories
employed to justify the results reached cannot always be approved.2215 The
328 Pa. 497 at 498, 499, 196 A. 39 (1938).
at 503: "The facts in the present case present a situation to which the doctrine
of promissory estoppel peculiarly applies, because they involve the announcement by plaintiff of the intended abandonment of his right to enforce Fisher's liability for rent, knowing
that such announcement would be relied upon by him to the extent of his embarking upon
a new business venture."
224 Note that here reimbursement for expenditures alone will not avoid injustice as
it may do in cases of gratuitous promises to make gifts of land. Fisher has changed his way
of life.
2 2 15 For an analysis of the cases see the following notes and co=ents: 50 HAnv. L.
R.Ev. 1314 (1937); 20 CALIF. L. REv. 552 (1932); 30 MicH. L. R.Ev. 1110 (1932). See
also PATrERSON AND GoBLE, CASBS ON CoNTRACTs, 2d ed., 309-315 (1941); 43 A.L.R.
1451; 93 A.L.R. 1404. For a recent discussion of the cases see, CORBIN, §184.
222

223 Id.
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holding that there has been a gift:2 26 may be tenable, if the landlord
intended to make one, and if that intention is accompanied by what
could pass as symbolical of "delivery," e.g., a receipt "in full," as well
as an acceptance by the tenant. 227 But all too often it is clear that such
was not the landlord's intention. He appeared to be bargaining, not
giving. In such a situation the court twists the facts when it rests the
decision on gift analogies. Finding that the landlord is .bound because
the tenant has agreed to do something he was not previously bound to
do will meet any possible objection. If the facts justify such classification, all will agree that there is consideration. Here again, and all too
often, however, the court strains to fit the facts into a bargain and
exchange pattern, when some other solution is required. 228
Likewise, the argument that consideration is immaterial if the
agreement has been fully executed on both sides229 seems to beg the
question. For discharge to be effective, as has been said, there must be
either consideration or an effective gift.230 If there was a promise to
discharge, and only that, the need for consideration (or a substitute)
has not been obviated. So, too, with the holding that acceptance of the
lesser sum constitutes a waiver. 231
A theory which does seem to justify the decisions enforcing gratuious promises to reduce rents is embodied in yet another group of
cases,2 32 where it is ruled that adjustments of rent made in times of
economic stress will be enforced if they have formed the basis for action
by the parties. The emphasis placed upon action in reliance on a business transaction is as apparent and justifiable as was the decision in
Fried v. Fisher. Advantages in such rulings are found in the avoidance
of the strict application of Foakes v. Beer and in their agreement with
business ethics of the community.
Some states have found the solution to the problem of Foakes v.
226 McKenzie v. Harrison, 120 N.Y. 260, 24 N.E. 458 (1890); ANsoN, §413; GmsMORE, §206.
227 Gray v. Barton, 55 N.Y. 68, 14 Am. Rep. 181 (1873).
22s Bowman v. Wright, 65 Neb. 661, 91 N.W. 580, 92 N.W. 580 (1902); Industrial
Trust Co. v. Cottam, 65 R.I. 401, 14 A. (2d) 687 (1940). Lessee not filing petition in
bankruptcy; Melroy v. Kemmerer, 218 Pa. 381, 67 A. 699 (1907); Adams Recreation
Palace v. Griffith, 50 Ohio App. 216, 16 N.E. (2d) 489 (1937).
220 Brackett Co. v. Lofgren, 140 Minn. 52, 167 N.W. 274 (1918); Julian v. Gold,
214 Cal. 74, 3 P. (2d) 1009 (1932).
230WILLisToN, §120; ANsoN, §140; GmsMoRE, §206.
231 Hurlbut v. Butte-Kansas Co., 120 Kan. 205, 243 P. 324 (1926); Sutherland v.
Madden, 142 Kan. 343, 46 P. (2d) 32 (1935).
232 Ten Eyck v. Sleeper, 65 Minn. 413, 67 N.W. 1026 (1896); Liebreich v. Tyler
State Bank & Trust Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) 100 S.W. (2d) 152; Lindeke Land Co. v.
Kalman, 190 Minn. 601, 252 N.W. 650 (1934); Commercial Car Line v. Anderson, 224
ill. App. 187 (1922).
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Beer in statutory enactments which change the conventional requirement of consideration where modifying agreements are made. 233 Those
states which have not done so, may well decide that the application of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel can give a just result where otherwise hardship will be imposed. Support for this conclusion is also found
in decisions holding that municipal employees who have accepted less
than the salaries authorized by law for their positions cannot thereafter
collect the deficiency. 234
Just as they supply. precedents for it, so the rent reduction cases
afford an excellent opportunity to test the effectiveness of the doctrine
of promissory estoppel. If the facts show that a tenant is induced to
continue in business through an economic depression, rather than become bankrupt, because of his reliance upon the promise to reduce
the rent, his position is an appealing one. To force him now to make
up the difference will, in effect, leave him worse off economically than
he was before he acted in reliance on the landlord's promise. The
landlord's argument (based on Foakes 11. Beer) does not appeal to our
sense of fairness and justice; the tenant's does. If the tenant's change
of position was induced by the landlord's promise and was reasonably
foreseeable, he may often merit protection. But not all tenants will be
able to bring themselves within the doctrine. Before they can do so,
they must demonstrate: (I) a promise by the landlord to accept a lesser
sum than that agreed upon as rent; (2) action-in-reliance on that promise by the tenant (merely remaining in possession should not be enough
-the incurring of new obligations or a substantial change in methods
of operation might be); and, finally, (3) that it will be unjust to refuse
238 PATI'BRSON AND GoBLE, CASES ON CoNTRACTs, 2d ed., 324, n. 3 (1941): "The
requirement of consideration for modifying agreements has been changed by statute in
twelve states. Aside from differences in wording, these statutes are of three types: (a)
Those which make acceptance by the creditor of actual part performance by the debtor
(obligor) a valid discharge. Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 20-1204 (Park, 1938); Me. Rev. St., Ch.
96, Sec. 65 (1930); North Carolina Code of 1939, Sec. 895; Va. Code Sec. 5765 (1936).
(b) Those which require that the new agreement be in writing and executed by the creditor. Ala. Code, Sec. 5643 (Michie, 1928) •••; N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law, Sec. 243
(1936); N.Y. Personal Property Law, Sec. 33(2) (1937), N.Y. Real Property Law Sec.
279 (1936); Ore. Code Ann., Sec. 2-806 (1939); Tenn. Code, Sec. 9742 (Michie, 1938).
(c) Those which require both a writing and actual part performance by the debtor (obligor).
Cal. Civil Code, Sec. 1524; Mont. Code, Sec. 7459 (1935); N.D. Comp. Laws, Sec. 5828
(1913); S.D. Code, Sec. 47.0236, 1939." And see, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales,
§2-209 (1950 draft) abolishing the need for consideration in agreements to modify contracts.
234 Phillips, Exec. v. Cleveland, 130 Ohio St. 49, 196 N.E. 416 (1935) (the city
acted on the agreement and based its financial expenditures thereon); State ex rel. Hess v.
City of Akron, 56 Ohio App. 28, 10 N.E. (2d) 1 (1936), affd. in 132 Ohio St. 305, 7
N.E. (2d) 411 (1937) (if there was no consideration originally, the change of position by
the city would supply it. Contracts Restatement §90); Lehman v. Toledo, 48 Ohio App.
121, 192 N.E. 537 (1934).
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enforcement. If all three elements are present the difficulties inherent
in determining the tenant's monetary damages seem to make it appropriate to protect him by the enforcement of the landlord's promise.
Doctrinal difficulties may be solved rationally and logically by the application of promissory estoppel to this situation.
SYNTHESIS AND GENERALIZATION

What conclusions are to be drawn from these precedents? Here
are numerous examples of gratuitous promises drawn from diverse legal
situations. The very diversity of the type-situations discussed test the
validity of the general proposition here proposed. If, in only a single
instance, it is found that action in reliance upon a gratuitous promise
results in enforcement despite the lack of a bargain, all that will follow
is a question as to why the court did not apply the stereotyped rule.
Even if these instances become quite numerous in a particular field of
the law, the reaction may be no more.than to recognize an "exception"
to the "general" rule. But if on numerous occasions and in multifarious
fields instances occur in which to avoid injustice gratuitous promises
are enforced when set in a context of detrimental reliance, then one
is compelled to examine the cases and correlate the. results which follow
from the presence of the gratuitous promise and detrimental reliance.
When one does so the significant factors appear which permit of synthesis and generalization.
The thread that runs through all the cases is reliance. 235 In this
reliance, the doctrine of promissory estoppel has its justification; in
these precedents, it has its genesis. The precedents show that the application of the doctrine has secured substantial justice in numerous
cases and in many fields of the law. The precedents indicate, too, that
the doctrine of promissory estoppel should not be confined to specific
small segments in restricted branches of our contract law. It now merits
recognition as a generalization of principle; it should be so employed.
235 WILLISTON,

enforcement).

§139;

CORBIN,

§§193-209 (reliance on a promise as ground for

